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Commercial Law
INSURANCE
J. Denson Smith*
Insurance companies fared very well before the court during
the last term. They won two and lost one of the cases herein
noted and both cases in which they prevailed involved problems
of interpretation of policy provisions. In a case of first impression the court rejected a claim for $5,000.00 under a policy of
automobile liability and collision insurance containing an endorsement providing for the payment of the amount claimed for
the accidental death of the "insured."' The named insured was
the plaintiff in the case and the claim was based on the death
of his minor daughter resulting from an accident involving the
automobile covered by the policy. His position was that his
daughter was an "insured" within the meaning of the endorsement. The court found that the language of the endorsement
was sufficiently explicit to limit its application to the named
insured and denied the claim of ambiguity.
In Monteleone v. American Employers' Insurance Co.2 the
court was invited to find an ambiguity in a money and securities
policy which provided coverage "for loss of money and securities
by the actual destruction, disappearance or wrongful abstraction
thereof outside the premises while being conveyed by a messenger." The loss had resulted from a burglary of plaintiff's
home. The money had been brought there from his business
establishment by the plaintiff the night before and he intended
to take it to the bank later in the day. The court refused to find
the provision ambiguous and thereby aligned itself with similar
cases in other jurisdictions. While at the plaintiff's home it was
not being "conveyed by a messenger."
After an exhaustive review of a voluminous record the court
concluded, in Wells v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co.,3 that the defendants had failed to establish by convincing proof that a fire which
destroyed plaintiff's home and automobile was of incendiary
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origin and that it was caused by the plaintiff insured. Evidence
that the fire was of incendiary origin was lacking and proof of
motive was weak, although the circumstances were very suspicious.
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
Paul M. Hebert*
The problem of "connexity" between a finance company and
the dealer as relates to the protection afforded the holder in due
course of a negotiable instrument was before the court in Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Alker,' in an interesting factual setting.
The defendants, Alker and Duvic, affixed their signatures to a
note and chattel mortgage using a form furnished by the finance
company to the vendor, Orleans Motor Company. The note and
chattel mortgage when executed were on one sheet of paper, the
note being detachable by means of perforations. On the face of
the chattel mortgage there was a space designated under the
printed heading "Customer" and this blank had been filled in to
show J'Alkard Enterprises, Inc. This corporation was newly
formed and insolvent at the time of the suit. The two defendants
were officers of the corporation and were sued individually on
the note. Consideration for the note was a ranch wagon purchased for the corporation. The chattel mortgage security could
not be enforced because the vehicle, after its purchase, had been
sent by the corporation to Mexico on business and had not been
returned. The signatures of the two defendants appeared on
both the note and the chattel mortgage without any designation
of capacity other than as individuals. There was nothing in the
note to indicate that the defendants were signing in a representative capacity. The defense was (1) that defendants subscribed
the note solely for and on behalf of the corporation in their representative capacity as officers without intent to be personally
bound thereon; and (2) that the payee motor company was agent
or representative of the plaintiff finance company or was so
identified with the payee that knowledge of the limited purpose
for which defendants were alleged to have signed were imputed
to the finance company under the doctrine of Commercial Credit
Co. v. Childs2 and C.I.T. Corp. v. Emmons.3
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